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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
W. DANIEL ENGLISH,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Priority No. 16

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 900422-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Defendant/Appellant Standard Optical Company ("Standard")
submits the following brief in reply to the Brief of
Plaintiff/Respondent W. Daniel English ("English") and in support
of its appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STANDARD IS NOT BARRED FROM
RAISING A STATUTE OF FRAUDS DEFENSE.
The first issue English raises in his brief is whether
Standard waived
its right to interpose the statute of frauds
as a defense to the oral agreement to pay
$1,000 per month for the third 36-month
period of the written lease as a result of
Standard's admission in its pleadings and at
trial that it agreed to pay $1,000 per month.
English Brief, p. 1. English then devotes POINT II of his Brief
to the argument that Standard admitted at trial and in its Trial
-1-

Brief the existence and all the essential terms of an agreement
to extend the Lease for another 36 months and is therefore barred
from asserting the statute of frauds defense.
16-20.
A.

English Brief, pp.

Standard expressly denies the premise of this argument.

Standard did not waive the statute of frauds defense.
English has conveniently failed to reveal to the Court that,

in his Complaint, he did not allege an oral agreement on an
extension or on any of the terms of the lease.

After presenting

his case at trial, and over the express objection of appellant,
English moved to amend his complaint to include a claim that on
November 2, 1988 the parties orally agreed on a rental amount for
the next 36 months.
7.

Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 42, lines 5-

Despite Standard's opposition to English's motion to amend,

the trial court granted the motion.

Id.

at pp. 42-44.

Standard

then made a timely motion to amend its Answer to include the
statute of frauds defense.

That motion was granted without

opposition from English. ^Id. at pp. 44-45.
Prior to the trial court granting English's motion to amend,
there was no reason for Standard to assert a statute of frauds
defense as no oral agreement had been alleged.
therefore could not have waived the defense.

Standard
Indeed, the only

conceivable waiver under these facts, is English's waiver of the
right to assert an oral agreement.

Despite the fact that English

knew the facts upon which he based his claim prior to his
commencing this action, he failed to plead an oral agreement
-2-

until halfway through the trial. His motion to amend was
untimely and granting it was clearly prejudicial to Standard.
B.

English waived the issues it raises for the first time on

appeal.
This is the first time English has raised the issue of a
waiver of the statute of frauds defense in this lawsuit.

The

issue was not raised below, in argument at trial, or in English's
Memorandum in Response to Standard's Motion to Amend the
Judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court has forcefully and consistently held
that an appeals court will not consider issues raised before it
for the first time.

Sorenson v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah

1987); Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); Insley
Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah
1986).

In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659

P. 2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983), the court stated that the record
must clearly show that an issue was "timely presented to the
trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we
cannot assume that it was properly raised."

If a party fails to

present an issue to the trial court, it will have "waived the
right to raise it" on appeal.
85 (Utah 1983).

Utah County v. Brouwn, 62 P.2d 83,

"It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not

raised by the parties in a trial [court] cannot be considered for
the first time on appeal."

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100,

102 (Utah 1983).
-3-

Because English did not raise the issue of a waiver of the
Statute of Frauds defense in the trial court, he has waived the
right to raise that issue on appeal.

Consequently, POINT II of

plaintiff's brief should not be considered by this Court.
POINT II
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PRECLUDES
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LEASE AFTER AUGUST 1988.
Standard acknowledges that the writing necessary to satisfy
the statute of frauds may be comprised of several memoranda
which, taken together, contain the terms of the agreement.

In

the instant case, however, the "memoranda" relied upon by English
and the trial court do not contain the terms of the alleged
agreement.
English had the burden of proving an agreement on the
essential terms of a lease renewal.

In this case, those terms

included agreement upon a 36-month duration.

English asks this

Court to supply the essential 36-month term of duration by
implication.

Such a critical and material term, however, cannot

be implied.
English relies upon the proposition that the statute of
frauds may be satisfied by looking at the implied references in
the various writings and the surrounding circumstances. English
Brief, p. 23. The evidence adduced at trial, however, is of
written references and surrounding circumstances directly
contrary to finding an agreement to renew the lease.
-4-

The evidence in the record suggests that no agreement was
reached as to rental for a renewal term of 36 months. The
undisputed evidence is that both parties knew a writing
specifying the amount of rent to be paid, the term of the
extension and signed by the parties was required to renew the
lease.

Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 11-13.

Nonetheless, no

attempt was made by either party to draft such a writing after
August 1988.
English acknowledges that the parties had been negotiating
for a "settlement" or "buyout" (English Brief, pp. 26-27), but
nevertheless asserts that Schubach's November 2, 1988 statement
that Standard would pay $1,000 a month constituted an agreement
to renew the lease for an additional 36 months rather than an
agreement on a buyout or settlement.

Such an interpretation is

not supported by the record.a
Furthermore, it is undisputed that English changed the locks
on the premises on October 18, 1988.

The natural consequence of

changing the locks on a building is to deprive the persons with
keys to the original locks of access and possession.

As a matter

of law, it is assumed that one intends the natural consequences
of his acts.
a

In the instant case, there is no evidence that

It should be noted that, since the trial and less than
36 months after the alleged lease renewal, English sold
the building at 3525 Market Street to the West Valley
RDA and the building has been torn down. Thus, prior
to expiration of the alleged renewed lease, English has
rendered his performance impossible.
-5-

anyone other than Standard and English had a key to the original
locks on the premises.

The only permissible implication of

English changing the locks is that he intended to deprive
Standard of access to and possession of the premises.

Such an

intent is clearly inconsistent with English's argument that the
parties intended to renew the lease.
Even English's letter of December 2, 1988, which the trial
court relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds, indicates
that English's intent was directly contrary to a lease renewal.
See Trial Exhibit 13P (included in Addendum to Standard's opening
Brief).

He indicates an intent to rent the premises to another

tenant and to complete "settlement" with Standard.

Id.

It is

inconceivable how such a memorandum could be sufficient to
evidence an agreement to renew the lease with Standard.
Rhetorically, one is compelled to ask:
not one year or four years?

Why 36 months?

Why

The base lease provided that it

would run for 10 years but the rent had to be renegotiated every
three years.

It did not provide that renewals had to be in

three-year increments —

that would make no sense because 10 is

not equally divisible by three.

The fact is that there is no

evidence in the record before this Court evidencing an intent by
either party to renew the lease for three years.
To conclude that the statute of frauds requirements are
satisfied by the writings and testimony in evidence in this case
would require such a tortured interpretation of the statute that
-6-

it would, in effect, be stripped of all practical meaning.
burden of proof in this case is on English.

The

He had to prove that

the parties agreed to renew the lease for an additional 36 months
and he has simply failed to do so.
POINT III
ENGLISH HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE GAVE ANY
CONSIDERATION FOR A LEASE RENEWAL.
As Standard explained more fully in its opening brief, a
lease contract must necessarily include the landlord's conveyance
of a right of exclusive possession to the tenant.

See Standard

Brief, p. 22. English does not dispute that this is the law.
English's position continues to be that, in November 1988,
Standard promised to pay rent under the 1982 lease for an
additional 36 months in exchange for nothing from English.

Such

a promise, even if made, is not an enforceable contract.
English's argument that Standard was never deprived of
possession of the premises is unsupported by the evidence and
incorrect as a matter of law.

First, he takes the untenable

position that "Standard effectively gave English permission to
change the lock" by "declarfing] that it was not in the leasing
business and that it was English who was in the leasing
business."

English Brief, p. 31.

English argues that this

"instruction" implied that English could change the locks before

•7

finding another tenant.

jDd. Acceptance of this argument

requires an incredible stretch of the imagination.2
English further confuses the issue of possession.
argument is essentially two-pronged.

His

While he admits he changed

the locks without notifying Standard, he argues that because he
did not intend to deprive Standard of possession, and because
Standard was able to gain access to the premises each time it
tried, Standard was never deprived of possession.
Whether English deprived Standard of possession of the
premises is clearly not a question of English's subjective
intent, especially where it relates to the issue of
consideration.

Furthermore, English's argument that Standard

continued in possession because it was never denied access is
like arguing that because a customer has never been denied access
to a 7-Eleven, he has possession of the store.

The flaw in such

an argument is apparent.
English's uncontradicted testimony at trial was that after
October 18, 1988 Standard had to demand a key from English to
gain access to the premises.

Trial Transcript, Vol. I, pp.

136-137, lines 18-1 and p. 139, lines 4-7; and See Dore
Testimony, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 36, lines 7-12.
2

The Utah

In connection with this argument, English for the first
time raises an estoppel and waiver argument. See
English Brief, pp. 32-33. English never raised
estoppel and waiver in the trial court and is precluded
from now raising these issues on appeal. See Point I,
B. , infra.

Supreme Court has unequivocally stated as a matter of law that
where a landlord has changed the locks on a leased premises, he
has deprived the tenant of possession, even where the tenant is
able to obtain access upon demand.
Services, 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988).

Bass v. Planned Management
On this issue, Bass is

indistinguishable from the instant case.
English has failed to establish that he gave any
consideration to Standard for the alleged promise of Standard to
pay rent for an additional 36 months.

Under these circumstances

there could be no enforceable lease after August 1988.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Standard Optical Company
respectfully requests that the judgment below be reversed and
judgment entered in favor of Standard Optical Company.
DATED this A>~

day of January, 1991.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ByC^^^q^t

3.<SL^

George A./Hunt
Kurt M. Frankenburg
Attorneysvicr
Defendant/Appellant
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